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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
As government agencies search for ways to work effectively with nonprofit organizations, 
there is a growing need for strategies that resolve the long-standing tension between the public 
sector’s need for accountability and the nonprofit sector’s desire for autonomy.  This article 
considers the way a state agency in Oklahoma worked toward resolving this tension by 
restructuring its contracting system with nonprofit organizations.  Different from both fee-for-
service systems that require heavy auditing and simple outcome funding that can distort the 
complexity of programs, Oklahoma’s “milestone contracting” specifies a series of distinct and 
critical client achievements and confers payment for this set of collaboratively defined results.  
This approach to public-nonprofit contracting represents a promising way to achieve public 
accountability while protecting the autonomy nonprofit organizations need to deliver 
programs that meet local needs. 
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 Over the past three decades, the nonprofit sector has undergone a major 
transformation in the way it finances its operations.  Few nonprofits today can survive on 
charitable contributions alone.  Instead, most successful agencies, particularly in the 
health and social services fields, depend in large measure on government contracts to 
supplement the fees they charge clients and the gifts they receive from donors.  The 
effects of this financial transformation of the nonprofit sector over time have been 
considerable.  The sector has grown rapidly in size, measured both in terms of the 
number of nonprofit organizations and the amount of resources devoted to nonprofit 
activity as a percent of gross national product (Boris, 1999).  Amidst the spectacular 
success of the nonprofit sector, nagging questions have emerged about the costs and 
implications of the growing importance of government funding to the overall financial 
health of the sector.  As the embrace between government and the nonprofit sector has 
grown stronger, no two issues are more critical than those of nonprofit autonomy and 
public accountability. 
When the issues of accountability and autonomy come together they generate a 
simple but pointed question: How can government and nonprofit organizations work 
together to deliver quality services in a way that respects nonprofits’ need for freedom in 
defining and pursuing their missions while at the same time responding to the public 
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sector’s need for accountability? As public sector agencies and nonprofit organizations 
around the country search for answers to the classic problem in contracting with 
nonprofit organizations, a recent innovation in the way a public agency in Oklahoma 
manages its contracts with nonprofit human service providers represents a potentially 
powerful solution to this dilemma.  Different from both hourly “fee-for-service” systems 
that require heavy auditing and traditional outcome funding that can distort the 
complexity of programs, Oklahoma’s “milestone contracting” specifies a series of 
distinct and critical achievements and confers payment for a set of collaboratively defined 
programmatic results.  This approach represents one of the most promising ways to 
achieve accountability and autonomy simultaneously.   
 
I.  Background and Problem Statement 
On the surface, nonprofit autonomy and public accountability seem to be in 
contension with one another.  Nonprofit organizations want and need autonomy to design 
innovative programs that meet community needs.  The independence that nonprofit 
organizations enjoy separates them from government and business organizations.  Free 
from both the pressures of public opinion and the demands of shareholders, nonprofits are 
positioned, in principle at least, to act as vehicles for social experimentation and 
innovation.  The autonomy that nonprofits enjoy can be an important tool for delivering 
new and innovative solutions to long-standing public problems.  Many times, nonprofits 
working in fields as diverse as early childhood education and welfare-to-work transitions 
have made important breakthroughs that have influenced entire fields.  Innovation is not 
the only justification for nonprofit independence.  The autonomy of the sector is 
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protected in order to create a realm where private visions of the common good can be 
pursued and where the values and commitments of individuals can find expression.  The 
freedom that is granted to nonprofits by exempting them from taxation is thus designed to 
recognize their sovereignty and independence, while also giving them a subsidy to carry 
out their important work (Brody, 1998).   
The very independence that lies at the heart of the nonprofit sector’s privileged 
tax position can, however, be a major stumbling block when nonprofit organizations 
depend on direct financial support from government.  In almost every case in which 
public funds pass from federal, state or local authorities to nonprofit organizations, the 
public sector establishes and communicates expectations about both program design and 
performance.  These expectations arise out of government’s need for accountability and 
transparency.  Public funds carry with them a special burden that neither private gifts nor 
fees for service need shoulder.  Often anchored in a core commitment to equity and 
access, government grants must affirm and be applied to purposes that are in keeping 
with the public sector’s broad public agenda, one that is far wider than that of most 
private contributors or paying clients.  Accountability is a critical value in public sector 
organizations because it constitutes the foundation for both the legitimacy and support 
that government needs to carry out its work.   
At one level, therefore, the values of autonomy and accountability seem at odds 
with one another.  While nonprofit organizations might want to maximize the freedom 
they enjoy to experiment with new programs and service models, this impulse can and 
does come into conflict at some point with the public sector’s need for a certain level of 
uniformity and consistency in the programs it funds (DeHoog 1984; Smith and Lipsky 
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1993).  At the same time, while government might want to achieve very high levels of 
accountability in all the projects it funds, this impulse often comes into conflict with the 
desires of nonprofits to pursue their missions as they see best see fit (Gooden, 1998 
Kearns, 1996).  This tension between sectors can be depicted along a tradeoff line 
stretching from a combination of a high level of nonprofit autonomy and a low level of 
government accountability to a combination of a high level of government accountability 
and a low level of nonprofit autonomy.  Government has traditionally staked out a 
position somewhere near point A on the tradeoff line, while nonprofits have gravitated 
more in the direction of point B (see Figure1). 
  In most circumstances, this classic contracting tension is resolved in one of three 
ways: (1) The government adheres to a given decision making process and refuses 
compromise fearing loss of accountability, uniformity, and fairness; (2) The nonprofit 
organization refuses to give in to the demands of the government and either forgoes 
public funding or takes the funding but does not comply with mandates; or (3) 
Government and nonprofits reach an accommodation of sorts that produces less 
accountability and less autonomy.   This third solution results in both sides moving to 
point C in figure 1.  Often, this third option represents a sub-optimal, political 
compromise that satisfies neither side.  A central challenge for both public and nonprofit 
management comes down to finding a fourth alternative to this classic dilemma, an 
alternative that allows government and nonprofits to simultaneously maximize both the 
accountability and autonomy dimensions (point D in figure 1).  Such a solution  
 Figure 1 
Accountability and Autonomy in Public-Nonprofit Contracting 
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involves moving the production possibility frontier outward to reflect a new range of 
tradeoffs, a frontier on which a point can be located that both improves on the 
accountability and autonomy agendas of the public and nonprofit sectors. 
What might this fourth option entail? How can government meet its need for 
control, uniformity and accountability while giving nonprofits the freedom they need to 
design and implement innovative programs? One answer lies in the move away from 
process measures inherent in traditional fee-for-service arrangements and toward a 
system geared to outcomes (Behn and Kant 1999; Volkman, 1999).  In their contractual 
relations with nonprofit organizations, government agencies have traditionally focused on 
outputs, not client outcomes or actual results (Cline, 2000; Cohen and Eimicke, 1998; 
Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  Under the standard fee-for-service method of contracting, 
nonprofit organizations often are rewarded regardless of the outcomes of their efforts.  
Government simply pays out money to nonprofits based on contracts keyed to the 
delivery of units of service.  Thus, if a social service agency provides 1,000 hrs of 
counseling services at $35 an hour, a state funder would write a check for $35,000 upon 
presentation of an invoice.  Under fee-for-service arrangements, ultimate client results or 
outcomes are rarely tracked because they are not the basis on which the performance is 
measured or rewarded.  The consequences of this system reveal that there are rarely 
positive results when outcomes are not measured (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).   
As pressure for greater efficiency in the public sector has mounted over time, 
interest in changing the terms of government contracting rose.   A new system was 
needed, one that tracked the use of inputs, measured the outputs produced and, most 
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importantly, tracked the final outcomes.  By the early 1990s, the shift to performance-
based contracting (PBC) began.  The driving rationale behind PBC was the simple idea 
that public agencies need a way to ensure that they get impact for every public dollar 
spent and thereby ensure public support for government action (Zak Figura, 1999).   Also 
driving a move to PBC was the sense that government could and should learn about 
management from businesses.  The private sector has traditionally used a system of 
rewards to encourage certain actions and activities.  When organizations are funded 
according to outcomes, however, they focus on performance and devote themselves to 
improving it (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).   The Government Performance and Results 
Act of 1993 (GPRA, 1993) standardized this new and different approach.  It required that 
organizations that received federal money had to create specific goals and then post their 
advancement towards these ends (Buckmaster, 1999).   
While much of the impetus to measure outcomes came from accountability 
concerns, the shift has had ripple effects on public management (Buckmaster, 1999).  
This new mindset created the need to rethink the structure of performance measurement.  
When the focus is placed on performance and on paying nonprofits only upon 
demonstration of results and client outcomes, accurate assessment and performance 
measurement become critical (Herman and Heimovics, 1994; Murray and Tassie, 1994; 
Osborne, 1994; and Osborne and Tricker, 1995).  Outcome measurement requires new 
skills, including participatory planning, negotiated rules, quantitative and qualitative 
yardsticks, valid and reliable data collection, and a system for feeding information back 
into strategic planning systems.  An entire field can be enhanced when outcome 
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contracting is performed correctly and when best practices are shared (Buckmaster, 
1999). 
While outcome measurement procedures have been advocated as a means of eliciting 
better accountability and more effective program evaluation of nonprofit organizations, 
doubts about the efficacy of this approach persist.  Five broad problems and concerns 
have surfaced in the literature.  First, many managers resist the measurement of outcomes 
because they have previously seen it fail (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  One well-known 
example of how an outcomes-based system can go awry is the Job Training Partnership 
Act of 1982.  Providers were encouraged to target and train individuals who were most 
likely to succeed in a job, because their rewards were based upon the number of 
individuals that had secured job placements (Barnow, 2000).  Sadly, the incentives of this 
program encouraged providers to select and assist people who were likely to succeed but 
who may not have been neediest of the services (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992).  This 
phenomenon, often referred to as “creaming,” occurs when organizations receive 
payments, even when they follow the path of least resistance and avoid clients who are 
most in need of assistance.   
A second concern with keying program payment to outcomes is related to the 
possible gaming of such systems (Gibbons, 1998; Lu, 1999).  Defined as taking actions 
that increase pay-outs from incentive contracts without actually improving performance 
(Baker, 1992:600), gaming is a serious problem because it effectively negates the 
performance basis on which outcome funding rests.   When nonprofits and their activities 
are not being tracked closely, it is easy for organizations to engage in activities that may 
call for payment, but that may not represent the fulfillment of the contracts real 
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intentions.  By taking advantage of the black letter of a contract, nonprofits can 
undermine the spirit of a program (Brooks, 2000; Lawler, 1971, 1990; Hamner, 1975; 
Beer et al, 1984).   
Third, some worry that a shift from traditional fee-for-service contracting to 
performance-based contracting will create conflicts within many mission driven nonprofit 
organizations.  These conflicts can challenge an organization’s culture and identity.  For 
some organizations, moving to fee-for-service to outcome funding raises deep questions 
of control and internal priorities (Williams, Webb, and Phillips, 1991).  All aspects of 
nonprofit operation have the potential to be affected, from the location at which services 
are offered to the number of clients that are served (Smith and Lipsky, 1993).  Some 
nonprofits find the shift to outcomes stressful because it brings with it a commitment not 
just to results, but also to programmatic scale and expansion.  If outcome funding 
specifies both a rate of payment for a given set of outcomes and a minimum number of 
outcomes, nonprofits can be left scrambling to build the capacity to deliver services.   
To make these adaptations harder, many nonprofits have organizational cultures that 
are grounded in the belief that performance targets are not appropriate for many of the 
human services (Light, 2000).   Frequently, nonprofits have missions that are rooted in 
values and beliefs, and aim toward broad outcomes such as empowerment, improved 
quality of life, and community well-being.  The fulfillment of these missions is often very 
difficult to measure (Brower, Abofalia, and Carr 2000; Kanter, 1979; Drucker, 1992; 
Thompson and McEwan, 1958; Milofsky, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; Drucker, 1990; 
Salipante, 1995; in Buckmaster, 1999).  Resistance to keying programs to outcomes may 
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be strong if the chosen performance measures are seen as being detached from the broad 
social objectives of an organization (Stone and Gershenfield, 1996). 
 Fourth, outcome funding creates the concern that nonprofits will not be able to 
focus on the quality of their services, but instead become engrossed with the number of 
outcomes produced.  If reward systems are keyed to the achievement of results, there is 
the possibility that nonprofits will be forced to abandon their traditional systems of 
delivering services in favor of lower cost and lower quality methods.  The threat to 
quality is particularly acute in markets where multiple nonprofits are competing for 
contracts and where programs appear comparable.  In such cases, cost—not quality—
may become the deciding factor in which organizations receive contracts for the 
provision of services. 
Fifth, outcome funding can place personnel and human resources demands on 
nonprofits.  As nonprofits grow and change to meet new accountability standards, 
employees need to acquire the knowledge and skills that will enable them to successfully 
meet the challenges of their newly defined roles.  Program and technical staff may need 
special training to adapt to the new systems.  Also, as these organizations continue to 
expand and develop, there is a concern that there will not be enough money available to 
attract and hire the much-needed, well-trained staff (Blacksell and Phillips, 1994).  In 
organizations that traditionally depend on volunteers, the push to organize and 
professional-ize may lead these nonprofits to bring in paid staff (Billis, 1989).  The 
human resource challenge is rendered more acute when nonprofits are forced to compete 
with business firms for outcome contracts.  In the field of welfare to work services 
(Pavetti et al 1997; Jennings, 2000), where major corporations such as Lockheed and 
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EDS actively pursue outcome based contracts with states, nonprofits are struggling to 
attract and retain the best people in their organizations.   This is especially true when 
businesses can and will pay higher salaries (Frumkin and Andre-Clark, 2000).   
While the debate over the strengths and weaknesses of outcome funding rages on, 
public managers need to define for themselves in practice how they can best structure 
their relationship with nonprofit service providers.  As they develop contracting relations 
with nonprofit service providers, public managers will need to seek answers to the 
following question: How can the need for accountability be balanced with the need to 
give nonprofits freedom in program design and implementation?  Instead of ignoring this 
question and the emerging tensions created by contracting, a new perspective on public-
nonprofit relations is needed -- one that preserves some of the boundaries between 
sectors, that gives nonprofits as much freedom as possible, and that makes broad, multi-
dimensional appraisals of their performance easier.  Rather than see the nonprofit sector 
as the servant of the public sector that obediently executes programs, public managers 
must begin to take more seriously the unique visions, values, and commitments that 
animate the nonprofit sector itself and that lead to programmatic innovations.  Moving 
public management to a point where the values of public accountability and nonprofit 
autonomy can coexist will require the development of new strategies for managing 
public-nonprofit relations.  What would such strategies look like? An experiment in 
Oklahoma provides a glimpse of what a well-functioning, outcome-based system might 
look like (Rosegrant, 1998). 
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II.   The Oklahoma Milestones System 
 
Preparing people with mental and developmental disabilities to live and work 
independently in society has long been a dilemma for public policy.  Over the last several 
decades, many of the old solutions, including institutionalization as well as a variety of 
physical therapies, have been abandoned in favor of more humane measures that aim to 
assimilate the disabled into the broader community.  Beginning in the 1970s, the federal 
government mandated that the public schools educate disabled children in regular 
classrooms alongside other children and to prepare them to go to work after graduation.  
These changes did much to improve the prospects for many mentally and physically 
disabled young adults.  But, for those such as the profoundly disabled who needed more 
help, there was no place to go after graduation from high school.  For a long time, putting 
the profoundly disabled to work was not thought feasible, it thus took some time for the 
adult social services system to catch up with the education system.  Finally, in 1986, in 
response to pressure from a variety of advocacy groups, the federal government passed 
legislation that authorized the delivery of vocational services (referred to as “Supported 
Employment”) to people with “the most severe disabilities.”  
 After the legislation was passed, 10 states began receiving funding to start 
programs to train the severely disabled.  However, many other states were hesitant 
because they had not worked with the severely disabled before and thus required further 
impetus before they would respond.  In 1987, in response to a lawsuit brought by the 
parents of children who had been residents of Oklahoma’s largest institution for the 
developmentally disabled, Oklahoma began planning a program to train disabled adults to 
work in integrated jobs in their communities.  In 1988, the Oklahoma Department of 
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Rehabilitation Services began providing employment assessment and training services for 
adults through community-based nonprofits (and a few selected government agencies).  
Eligible individuals—primarily people with mental retardation or mental illness, though 
people with many other disabilities were also eligible—are those for whom direct 
placement in a job in their community is the desired outcome.  Typically, they would be 
paired with a job coach in order to assist them in locating and getting a job.  Since they 
were providing a new service and did not really have any idea what it would cost, the 
state decided to structure the program as a traditional fee-for-service model that would 
reimburse the nonprofits at an hourly rate for all services provided.   
 
A.  Planning Change and Moving to Outcomes 
 By 1991, the program had expanded significantly, working with 20 nonprofits and 
serving nearly 500 clients.  But, Daniel O’Brien and Rebecca Cook, two administrators in 
the Community Rehabilitation Services Unit of the Department of Rehabilitation Services 
(referred to herein as “the agency”), concluded that the program was too expensive and 
that it was not doing a very good job of achieving the program’s stated objective, training 
disabled people for integrated employment in their communities.  For example, in 1991, 
it cost the agency more than $22,000 and an average of 438 days to bring a single case to 
closure.  They concluded that the major cause of these problems was the agency’s fee-
for-service reimbursement structure, which created a distortion in the way the goal was 
pursued.  This structure put too much emphasis on the process of providing the 
services—on ability and skills assessments, job training, and constant supervision once 
employed (all of which would be billed on an hourly basis to the state)—at the expense of 
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moving the clients as quickly as possible into stable jobs.  They concluded that the 
system had created two competing goals, an implicit one, to maximize the number of 
hours spent on a particular client, and an explicit one, to get clients into employment.   
More often than not, the implicit goal took precedence.  According to Cook, “the 
emphasis was not on the individual that they were serving… It was on billing hours….  
We’ve got everything askew here.  We have a system in place, but it costs too much 
money and it’s not doing what it ought to do.”  
 Cook and O’Brien aimed to devise a new way of paying for services that would, 
in the fairest and most efficient and cost-effective manner possible, put the emphasis back 
on the outcome.  Their goal, according to O’Brien, was to create “an incentive for [the 
nonprofits] to find the inefficiencies in their system and to eliminate them.  Within the 
hourly system, we created inefficiencies … by the way we paid.  There was no incentive 
for them to find the inefficiencies and we couldn’t find them because we’re external to 
their organization.” The goal was thus to construct a system that would force everyone to 
compete with the most efficient and effective nonprofits. 
After much deliberation, O’Brien and Cook designed a system, which they called 
Milestones, that would reimburse nonprofits when clients reached each of a series of 
steps—the “milestones”—along the way to getting a job.  (To qualify as a “job,” federal 
guidelines require that the client work at least 20 hours a week and must earn at least 
minimum wage.) The milestones, designed to be easily observable, would involve 
looking at indicators such as job retention, wages, and employer and client satisfaction.  
The largest payment would be the final milestone, full employment for 17 weeks plus 90 
days (known as “26 closure”).  Milestones would reimburse the nonprofit for the 
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“average” cost of providing the outcome of the service rather than (in fee-for-service) for 
the cost of staff time.  The structure of the milestones would differ slightly depending on 
whether the clients had mental or developmental disabilities, but looked roughly like this: 
determination of need—10%; vocational preparation—10%; placement—10%; four week 
job retention—15%; ten weeks job retention—15%; stabilization—20%; 26 closure—
20%.   
In order to encourage the nonprofits to make good matches, the organization 
would only be paid once for each milestone.  According to Cook, “It’s very motivating to 
the vendor to make a good job match to begin with.” In order to aid nonprofits in taking 
on more difficult clients, the Milestones system also created a two-tiered system of 
payments through which service providers would be paid higher fees for serving people 
designated as “highly challenged.”  Cook notes, “We try to define who are the people 
who cost more money for the vendor to serve so that we can build a rate into the system 
that will help them say, ‘It’s OK to take a chance on this person because they are going to 
pay us more for him.’” 
 The agency solicits bids from primarily community-based nonprofits to care for a 
specified number of clients in the following year.  To put together a bid, the nonprofit 
first must develop a budget that includes estimates for the number of clients they will 
serve and the number of staff they will need.  Then they develop a bid based upon the 
average cost per closure from the previous year multiplied by the estimated number of 
closures for the contract year.  Comparing the estimated number of clients to the 
estimated number of closures allows them to account, to some extent, for “dropouts,” 
people who for whatever reason will not reach closure (and thus will deprive the 
 nonprofit of the final, biggest payment).  According to O’Brien, the bidding process 
forces all the service providers “to compete against the average, bringing down the high, 
the very inefficient providers, pressuring them to move towards the average.” Once the 
bids are received, DRS evaluates them—by looking in particular at the per-customer bid 
price and the average cost per closure, as well as past history and the geographical area 
served—and then negotiates with the nonprofit organizations to arrive at a reasonable 
bid.   Required documentation at each stage ensures progress and triggers payment. 
 
Figure 2 
 
The Milestones Bidding Process 
PROPOSAL 
EVALUATION 
 
Conducted by team 
of DRS 
representatives 
 
 
 
    AWARD      NONPROFITS DEVELOP BID 
                  PROPOSAL 
• Develop program budget 
using bid formula 
• Estimate number of 
individuals they can assist 
• Project number of persons 
with disabilities who will 
complete each milestone 
Two sections: 
• Supported Employment 
(required) 
• Employment and Retention 
(optional)  16 
NEGOTIATION 
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Figure 3 
 
MILESTONE     DOCUMENTATION NEEDED* 
 
 
 * source: http://www.onenet.net/~home/milestone/tecontr.html 
 
 
Step 1:  Determination of Needs   • Computerized Progress Report 
• Situational Assessment Reports and/or Vocational Assessment Forms 
• Summary Vocational Assessment Report or Vocational Profile Form 
Step 2:  Job Placement (SE only) • Computerized Progress Report 
• Employment Verification Form signed by employer 
• Task Analysis Form 
• Job Analysis Form 
Step 3:   Job Training 
 
• Dates and hours of attendance (attendance sheets submitted) 
• Consumer has completed program 
• Consumer has achieved 75% of pre-defined competencies 
 
 
Step 4:  Job Site Fading (TE only) 
• Employment Verification Form (verification of continued 
employment and hours worked per week will be required for payment) 
• Employer Evaluation Form 
• Record of off job site supports provided 
• Computerized Milestone Report including summary note 
• Record of hours worked each week---only weeks where hours 
exceeded 40% of the weekly work goal and in which training or 
support were provided will be counted 
 
 
Step 5:  Stabilization 
• Employment Verification Form  
• Employer Evaluation Form 
• Consumer Job Satisfaction Questionnaire 
• Computerized Milestone Report including summary note 
• Record of hours worked each week---only weeks where hours 
exceeded 40% of the weekly work goal and in which training or 
support were provided will be counted as one of the four weeks 
 
Step 6:  Transition to External 
Support/Closure 
• Employment Verification 
• Consumer Job Satisfaction Questionnaire 
• Computerized Milestone Report including summary note 
• Employer Evaluation Form 
 
Step 7:  Independent Employment/Career 
Placement (TE  only) 
• Summary pages from the Vocational Interest Inventories and Job 
Success Plan 
• Job/Worker Discrepancy Analysis and Training Plan 
• Employment Verification 
• Consumer Job Satisfaction Questionnaire 
• Computerized Milestone Report including summary note 
BONUS 
(This payment is only available to cases 
eligible for cost reimbursement to DRS by 
the Social Security Administration; an 
individual who meets the Social Security 
Administrations requirements for 9 
months of Substantial Gainful Activity) 
          
• Verification of Completed DRS SSA Reimbursement Forms 
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Though the specific arrangements may differ some from one service organization 
to another, the process involves three key figures.  First, counselors (something of a 
misnomer, since they do not actually “counsel” or work with clients), who are employed 
by the agency, authorize services to approved nonprofits.  They oversee a number of 
different service providers and supervise the technical assistants.  Second, technical 
assistants, who are also employed by the agency, train and oversee the job coaches.  
Third, job coaches, who are employed by the nonprofit, work directly with the client.  
They may work with anywhere from 5 to 12 (or sometimes more) clients at any one time.  
The job coaches try to find jobs in environments that will support the client.  If a client 
has very restricted skills—most have at least three functional limitations—they will look 
for a job that requires one or two of those skills, which usually means entry level 
positions at low wages.  By all accounts, being a job coach is an enormously difficult and 
low-paying job.  According to one estimate, regardless of training, it takes a job coach 
two years to become proficient. 
 
B.  Implementation and Expansion 
 The earliest Milestones pilots—two nonprofits that served mentally ill 
individuals—were funded in October of 1992.  Several other pilots followed over the 
next several years.  In order to prepare the nonprofits to make the transition from fee-for-
service to Milestones with minimum confusion, the technical assistants from the agency 
held numerous training sessions and retreats with managers and job coaches.  These were 
implemented so that they would understand how the bidding procedures worked and what 
would be expected of them in terms of outcomes once they received contracts.  
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According to Cook, “We tried very hard from the very beginning of supported 
employment to bring vendors in as partners into the process of what we were trying to do 
… they were accustomed to us calling them and saying, ‘What do you think about this?’” 
Still, in 1997, when the remaining programs from across the state that work with the 
agency were converted to Milestones, they faced much trepidation on the part of the 
nonprofits.  Many were concerned that they would be forced to spend less quality time 
with their clients and others were worried that the nonprofits would be forced to select 
clients most likely to reach closure.  The executive director of one Milestones nonprofit, 
worrying that the quality of services would suffer, commented, “Will we really still be 
able to perform services in a similar manner to what we do now if it is purely outcome 
based?” 
 The changeover proved fairly painless for organizations that had been highly 
effective under fee-for-service.  However, for many others, there were considerable 
growing pains.  Looking back on the shift, 36% of nonprofits involved with the program 
said the overall transition to Milestones was challenging.  Despite all the preparation, 
getting adjusted to the new bidding system simply took some time and adjustment.  Many 
nonprofits had bids rejected two or even three times before the agency determined that 
they were eligible for funding.  For some, it was a struggle to shift the focus of their 
organization from “process” to outcomes.  It also became clear that many managers were 
not immediately up to the job of running effective outcome-focused organizations and 
many job coaches simply did not have the skills and experience to work with profoundly 
disabled people.  According to one technical assistant who spent a lot of time working 
with nonprofits during the transition, many of them “didn’t have the skills for the job.” A 
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few nonprofits dropped out because they did not believe philosophically that employment 
should be the only outcome available to people in the program. 
 Finally, the clients with mental illness raised a host of additional complications.  
While the founders of Milestones were convinced that integrated work in the community 
was just as important for the mentally ill as for the developmentally disabled, the 
directors of many of the nonprofits serving the mentally ill did not see employment in the 
community an appropriate goal for their clients.  According to Cook, “We had great 
difficulty getting mental health centers to see beyond [the view that] the person comes in 
for therapy, the person takes medication, the person sits and smokes and watches 
television all day, and getting them to see that work is part of the recovery process.” 
Thus, it took a while for some organizations to come around, while many still have not 
and do not work with Milestones.   
 Under a system like Milestones, which trades some control for improved 
outcomes and programmatic freedom, how is success measured? Most obviously, the key 
measure is increased achievement of the core outcome, the placement of disabled people 
into stable jobs in their communities.  The agency also looked at success in two other 
ways, the satisfaction of the consumers (meaning mainly the clients and the employers, 
but also the counselors and job coaches) and a reduction in the need for regulation and 
oversight.  By these three measures, for the vast majority of those involved, Milestones 
has been a dramatic success.  The clients are receiving the kind of support that they need 
and are being placed in jobs in greater numbers and with far more success and 
satisfaction than before.  The employers are getting well-trained employees who are often 
more dedicated to their jobs, and thus longer lasting, than non-disabled workers, which 
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saves the employers additional funds in training costs.   The agency is getting greater 
impact because the system links funding with outcomes, which builds public support for 
the agency’s mission.  And the nonprofits are doing a much better job of achieving their 
explicit goal—and they are being rewarded for it.  According to a 1997 survey, 13 of 16 
nonprofits that had converted had shown improvement in all areas.  Time on waiting lists 
was reduced by half; time before job placement was reduced by 18 percent; the cost of 
assessments was reduced by 9 percent; paperwork decreased by 33 percent; data entry 
items were reduced by 98 percent; and the cost per closure dropped by 25 percent.   To 
give a more specific example, Goodwill of Tulsa has become twice as productive under 
Milestones as it was under fee-for-service: They have been able to treat twice as many 
clients under Milestones with the same budget they had under fee-for-service.  (See 
sidebar.) 
 When asked what difference Milestones has made, most nonprofits seem to agree 
that the new, less-onerous reporting requirements under Milestones have freed the job 
coaches to spend more time—not less, as had been feared by many nonprofits—with 
clients.  It has also freed the managers to spend more time supporting their job coaches 
and making sure their organizations are being run efficiently.  One Milestones participant 
says that his organization saves three months a year in employee time because of the 
reduction in paperwork.  One nonprofit manager echoed these thoughts when she said, 
“Fee for service is a headache because there is so much paperwork involved.”  That 
alone—the hours more per week that they have to work with clients—may go a long way 
toward explaining why Milestones has been so much more successful in achieving 
outcomes than the old fee-for-service system.   
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 Most of those with experience under Milestones seem to agree that the 
transparency of Milestones—the idea that everyone understands their role in pursuing 
Milestones’ main goal—makes it much easier for them to do their jobs.  The clients 
know, from the beginning, that they will have to follow a number of steps over a period 
of time and, at the end, they will have a job.  The nonprofits know that they have to scout 
for jobs more aggressively, and are encouraged to spend more time marketing—
themselves and their clients—which hadn’t been a priority under fee-for-service.  When a 
job coach focuses on making sure that a placement is suitable from the beginning of the 
process of working with a client, it often means that the first placement fits well, meaning 
that both the client and the employer are happy, and the placement is a success. 
 In order to investigate this level of satisfaction further, a group of 20 nonprofits 
that participated in Milestones was randomly selected and surveyed in the fall of 2000.   
Three quarters of the group had been with Milestones for at least three years.  The group 
was asked a variety of different questions.  When asked about switching from their 
previous method of payment, 57% of the nonprofits polled said that their transition to the 
Milestones system was easy.  In response to follow up questions about the design of 
Milestones, 45% of the group said that the system afforded them a great deal of flexibility 
and 55% said they felt they had a lot of input in fine tuning their contract with DRS.  The 
system also perceived to be built on sound benchmarks: Almost half of nonprofits polled 
said that Milestones was extremely accurate in measuring client progress.  When the 
question of creaming was raised with nonprofits by asking if Milestones encouraged them 
to select clients who were more likely to succeed, 65 % of the group answered no.  When 
asked if the Milestones system increased their accountability to the state, 83 % responded 
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yes.   When the nonprofit organizations were asked to choose the method of payment 
they preferred, 80% chose Milestones over fee-for-service.  At the end of the survey, 
75% of the organizations rated their overall experience with Milestones as good or 
excellent.   As one nonprofit manager said, “Milestones gives us a sense of 
accomplishment because the outcome is more clear.” These responses are particularly 
impressive given the fact that that in 2000 it cost the state $10,740 on average to bring a 
single case to closure, a substantial savings compared to an average cost in 1991 of 
$22,000.  Milestones have thus created real savings for the taxpayers without alienating 
the nonprofit service providers. 
 
C.  Challenges and Concerns 
 Though reaction to Milestones has been largely positive, the system does have its 
critics, and while most of them are managers with nonprofits that have performed poorly 
under Milestones, some of their concerns are worth considering.  From the outset, the two 
principal objections have been that the enhanced emphasis of the program on outcomes 
may potentially force the nonprofits either to provide a lesser quality service and that 
outcomes will lead nonprofits to screen their clients more carefully for those who are 
most likely to succeed.  The concerns voiced by nonprofits in Oklahoma correspond 
fairly closely to the first and third reservations about outcome funding that we outlined in 
our summary in the public management and contracting literature bearing on outcome 
funding. 
In the transition from fee-for-service to Milestones, many providers worried that 
they would have less time to spend with clients and thus the quality of service would 
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suffer.  A technical assistant commented, in discussions with nonprofits before the 
transition, “Quality of services kept coming up time and time again." But Milestones was 
designed explicitly to address this concern.  One of the big problems of fee-for-service 
that Milestones aimed to correct was that once a provider got on to the list of approved 
providers, they were almost never removed, no matter how ineffective they were at 
providing services.  O’Brien and Cook felt that nonprofits who were not able to deliver 
effective services ought to lose their contracts.  Given the nature of the clients seeking to 
achieve Milestones, proper training and sensible placements are essential, however.  
Milestones made nonprofit organizations, not the agency, responsible for outcomes, thus 
demanding of nonprofits that they provide quality services and penalizing them if they 
did not.  Beyond putting the onus for quality services on nonprofits, Milestones 
introduced careful monitoring of the end result of the service delivery system: The 
counselors under Milestones have been vigilant about not approving placements unless 
the clients were sincerely happy on the job.  The service provider is thus given 
considerable incentive to focus on quality and to make sure the job is a good fit from the 
beginning. 
 The second concern, the selection problem of “creaming” is more serious.  
O’Brien has commented that creaming is the “Achilles’ heal” of outcome-based payment 
systems.  He notes, “It is something we have to be constantly vigilant about.” One key 
measure to combat creaming was Milestones’ two-tiered structure of reimbursements that 
gives nonprofits a monetary incentive not to discriminate against harder-to-serve clients.  
Clients are designated as either regular (though all of these clients had substantial 
problems) or as “highly challenged,” and the nonprofits receive a larger payment—
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typically about $1,000 to $2,000 more than the regular payment—for taking on highly 
challenged clients.  Despite these measures, as well as the fact that their budgets are 
supposed to include estimates of dropout costs, some agencies appear to be hesitant to 
work with difficult clients because of the perceived risk involved in failing to achieve 
closure.  After all, the largest payment is the final one.  And it has been suggested by 
some that the larger payment may not be large enough to make it worth assuming the risk 
of working with the most challenged clients. 
 What looks to some observers like creaming may in fact be a byproduct of some 
remaining confusion about the purpose of Milestones.  If, however, Milestones 
accomplished nothing else, it was able to alter the incentive structure in support of a very 
clear and enforceable goal.  The concept of closure at the heart of this goal—integrated 
work for an extended period and a reasonable wage at a business in the community—
reflects the conviction of its designers that everyone who is capable and wants to work 
should be able to do so.  It also reflects that just about everyone can work if they get the 
right kind of assistance and support.  O’Brien notes that, “Work is part of what makes 
you feel part of the larger community.  And staff people who think work is too difficult or 
demanding can increase the stress clients feel and contribute to low self-esteem, low 
expectations, and an inability to function fully in society.”  He also comments, “We don’t 
believe in sheltered employment….  We don’t believe that it’s good for people.  It is 
institutionalizing….  The ideal is to put them in a normal environment, and what they 
start doing is acting like everyone else.”  
Further, they would suggest that the fact that no one who got screened out in the 
old system was a flaw in that system.  The reimbursement process under the old  
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fee-for-service system encouraged nonprofit inefficiency by rewarding organizations for 
accepting people who could not work and then extending the service delivery process so 
their budgets could get padded.  O’Brien comments, “It would take two or three years 
really to get to the point of saying, ‘OK, you’re not going to make it.’”  The reason for 
this, O’Brien contends, is that the agency had all the risks, “There was absolutely no risk 
in taking somebody who would never get a job.”  Those people who will not be able to 
make it to closure or who may be excluded because of their inability to work still have 
options available to them.  Other programs—at the state as well as federal level (e.g., 
programs such as Social Security, Title 16)—are available to help them with their needs.  
But Milestones is designed to encourage work and it ought to admit people who are 
capable of work.   
 
D.  Managing for Outcomes 
 Milestone contracting was designed to weed out ineffective or inefficient 
nonprofits and to give providers the opportunity to devise new interventions.  Thus, it 
should not be surprising that not every program that made the transition to Milestones has 
survived.  But for those who have stayed and been successful, the key seems to involve 
two related factors, namely strong management and effective job coaches.  Organizations 
with strong managers made the transition to Milestones with a fair amount of ease.  And 
organizations with good job coaches have been able to make good assessments and to 
place their clients into suitable employment the first time out. 
 One of the biggest obstacles to the success of Milestones was getting the 
nonprofits to change the way they approached their jobs, from a process-oriented mindset 
to an outcome-oriented one.  During the pilot phase, the agency spent a great deal of time 
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working with the nonprofits in order to ensure that they knew what would be expected of 
them under Milestones.  And it seems to have worked.  It is interesting to note that 
nonprofits commonly say that Milestones forced them to act in a more business-like 
fashion.  Analogies like this often break down rather quickly if one looks too closely, but 
in this case, what it seems to mean is that the nonprofits have been forced to treat 
potential employers as if they are customers.  Nonprofits have had to learn to market 
themselves to those customers with a fair amount of sophistication.  In order to ensure 
that the employer and the client are happy, they need to pay close attention to the needs 
of both so that they will make a good match.   
But how they do so—e.g., whether they will need more or fewer staff members or 
what kind of training they will use—is completely up to them.  According to Cook, “All 
we care about is, are you meeting the parameters of our contract in terms of outcomes? 
You figure out how you’re going to do it.”  The additional risk they assume under 
Milestones is balanced by the autonomy they have over how they will operate.  As long 
as the nonprofit meets the conditions of their contract—that is, they make (or surpass) the 
amount of placements they promised—they have complete freedom in determining the 
best way to do it.  Milestones clearly affirms a fair amount of nonprofit autonomy by 
turning the service delivery process into an opaque, if not black, box from which 
outcomes are generated. 
 In such a situation, an organization without strong management may soon be out 
of business, because the freedom given to nonprofits can be used to innovate or it can be 
an excuse to flounder.  Effective managers under Milestones have to be well organized in 
order to deal with the many start-up issues that come up and, because of the nature of the 
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contracting system they must be particularly adept at managing money.  Also, they have 
to know their “business” inside out so that they are able to recognize a good job coach 
from a bad one.  The job coach is really the lynchpin of the whole process.  One nonprofit 
manager noted, “The most important part in a client reaching closure is who the clients 
have as a job coach and how much that job coach is willing to help the client.  Most 
people quit if there hasn’t been substantial contact with the job coach.”  It may be worth 
noting that the job coaches seemed to have a better understanding of what would be 
expected from them under the new system than the managers did.  The amount of 
documentation and restrictions of the rules of the old system tended to frustrate job 
coaches.  They were also frustrated by the eternally open-ended process, with nonprofits 
having little incentive to “fade” the job coach to allow the client to function 
independently.  Under Milestones, roles and goals were clarified and risk was distributed 
so that everyone had a stake in achieving better outcomes.  One job coach commented, 
“We went from being caretakers to being coaches.” They found it liberating.  As another 
job coach noted, “I know if I have done my job well enough that this person is going to 
make it and we’ll get our payments.” 
 Milestones still has a few wrinkles that need to be ironed out.  High-performing 
nonprofits that place their clients too quickly into employment under one contract have 
no avenue for going back to Milestones if they run out of money.  According to O’Brien, 
“If you set up a system that has incentives for being productive, some people are going to 
go in and do that, and they’re going to do it better than anybody else….  And if you don’t 
have a way that they can grow their contract or grow their program, then, in effect, you’re 
going to punish them for doing good.”  Under the current program design, they must 
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either stop accepting new clients or operate for free until the new contract begins, neither 
of which is an attractive prospect.  In several cases, the agency has been able to renew 
nonprofits’ contracts early.  This is hardly a permanent solution, however.  One possible 
solution that has been proposed is to institute open-ended contracts.  The constant 
evaluation that Milestones necessitates would seem to offer enough accountability to 
make such an arrangement possible.  Others have suggested that Milestones might be 
effective as a voucher system, allowing the clients (or their surrogates) to make their own 
decisions about the quality of services. 
 Whatever the value of these and other suggested improvements, it remains true 
that Milestones has been a remarkably successful innovation in public management.  Fee-
for-service has long been the chosen method for governments to pay for contracted 
services under the modern welfare state.  But Milestones has shown that there is a 
plausible alternative to fee-for-service, an alternative that exchanges the worst incentives 
of the old system—inefficiency, over-regulation, and poor-performance—for the shared 
risk, greater accountability, heightened autonomy, and high performance of Milestones.   
 A few key elements are worth some emphasis.  The complexity of the change 
under Milestones necessitated extensive consultation on the part of the agency with the 
managers and job coaches or, it seems clear, it would have been a disaster.   To combat 
creaming, the two-tiered reimbursement process gave the nonprofits incentives to take on 
difficult cases.  The decision to set reimbursements at the average cost of a service was 
also crucial, giving the nonprofits incentives to root out inefficiencies within their 
organizations.  The decision to offer a final payment only once per case gave the 
nonprofit an incentive to make sure that the initial placement would be the right one.  
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Finally, by making the final payment the largest one and by making it only apply to real 
work in the community, Milestones encouraged the nonprofits to not waste time on 
training and assessment and to place the clients in jobs they were suited for.    
Perhaps the biggest obstacle to the success of Milestones was changing the 
mindset of the nonprofits.  It was to be expected that the providers who were comfortable 
under fee-for-service would offer some resistance in the face of change.  Managing the 
process under fee-for-service had been easy.  Nonprofits simply needed to keep track and 
bill the agency for every minute of the work day; maximize enrollment, extend client 
assessment and training time, and stay on the job site with the client as long as possible.  
In the end, the dominance of this way of thinking distorted the process, causing 
inefficiency and poor performance.  In sharp contrast, Milestones offered the nonprofits 
an interesting bargain: If the nonprofits do a better job of putting their clients to work, the 
state will leave it to the nonprofits to figure out the best way to achieve this goal.  Not all 
nonprofits were prepared to take the public sector up on this kind of bargain, but those 
who did have thrived.  These nonprofits have risen to the challenge and their clients are 
far better off for it. 
 
III.  Lessons Learned 
 
As nonprofit organizations consider the quality and impact of their relations with 
government, two fundamental concerns emerge that together constitute a strategic 
dilemma of significant proportions.  On the one hand, nonprofits must be open and 
accountable to the public agencies that fund them.  This usually entails complying with 
regulations and guidelines for the provision of contracted services, as well as completing 
evaluations and reports on the use of public funds.  On the other hand, nonprofits must 
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jealously guard their autonomy and independence.  This often comes down to protecting 
their distinctive missions and values in the face of pressures from outside.  For public 
managers, the stakes involved in working with nonprofits to strike the right balance could 
not be higher.  As devolution and privatization push more and more government 
functions “down” to lower levels of government, and as privatization continues to push 
government function “out” to contractors, the task of working effectively with nonprofit 
service providers is becoming ever more pressing.   
We identified at the outset the difficult tradeoff that nonprofit and public 
managers must strike between accountability and autonomy (see Figure 1).  Finding ways 
to satisfy both nonprofit and public agencies is clearly a challenging task.  Often, 
contracting relations prioritize accountability at the cost of nonprofit autonomy and end 
up supporting obedient, if uninspired, service providers who simply implement programs 
as instructed (point A in Figure 1 and cell A in Figure 4).  Other times, contracting 
systems privilege the autonomy demands of nonprofits at the cost of sound oversight and 
create room for nonprofit renegades to take advantage (point B in Figure 1 and cell B in 
Figure 4).  In some cases, neither value is optimized and nonprofit simply perform poorly 
as unaccountable and unproductive vendors (point C in Figure 1 and cell C in Figure 4).  
The core challenge in public management is to promote both the values of accountability 
and autonomy at the same time and to allow nonprofits to act as responsive innovators 
(point D in Figure 1 and cell D in Figure 4).  This appears to be happening in Oklahoma 
through the Milestones system. 
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The Milestones model is significant because it represents a clear attempt to move 
to contracting to an optimal mix of accountability and autonomy.  From the experience in 
Oklahoma, it is possible to draw some simple lessons for public managers on how to go 
about designing and implementing milestone contracts: 
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A.  Design Stage 
1. Collaborate with nonprofits in the initial design of milestones. 
Public managers should bring nonprofits into the process of designing milestones.  
One lesson that emerges from the Oklahoma experiment is that good communication 
between public and nonprofit managers early in the contracting design process is 
essential.  Many nonprofit organizations are likely to be apprehensive of a major shift in 
the way public contracts are administered.  Collaboration will go a long way toward both 
assuring nonprofit support for change and the selection of meaningful and appropriate 
measures of progress.  Public managers need to work to ensure that nonprofits buy into 
outcomes that are chosen and this means giving them a voice in the development of 
contracting system. 
 
2. Use a small number of milestones and use simple reporting forms. 
The Oklahoma experiment demonstrates that the number of milestones should to be 
kept modest if the system is to work efficiently.  When milestones become too numerous, 
the administrative oversight and reporting requirements become acute.  By keeping the 
number of outcomes small and by placing special emphasis on the final outcome sought, 
public managers can create room for nonprofits to innovate by freeing them from heavy 
reporting requirements.  While the number of appropriate milestones will vary 
considerably depending on the kind of service being delivered, public managers should 
err on the side of too few rather than too many milestones. 
 
3. Shape incentives to avoid creaming. 
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Worries about client creaming were present in Oklahoma.  Rather than dismiss these 
concerns out of hand, it is useful to confront them directly and to reassure nonprofits that 
incentives will be established to encourage organizations to continue to tackle the most 
difficult cases.  By paying more money for hard to serve cases and by allowing nonprofits 
to get paid based on the risks they assume, public managers can move toward removing 
the incentives that some agencies might have to become selective in the clients they serve 
under a milestone payment system. 
 
B.  Implementation Stage 
4. Help nonprofits make the shift from fee-for-service systems to outcomes. 
Shifting away from fee-for-service clearly creates stress for nonprofit organizations.  
It removes a long held safety blanket from these organizations and introduces 
contingencies into their funding.  This can be a source of cultural conflict within 
nonprofits, as long standing priorities and practices must be revisited in light of changes 
in the funding environment.  To the extent possible, public managers need to be sensitive 
to these stresses that changes in payment systems can create and to work directly with 
nonprofit organizations to explain milestone systems and the rationale for moving away 
from fee-for-service systems.  Demonstrating that milestones have the potential to both 
reduce paperwork and increase programmatic freedom may go a long way to ease 
nonprofits' concerns. 
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5. Be flexible and revisit milestones once a system is in operation. 
Flexibility is a virtue in outcome funding.  Although milestones allow the state to 
treat all nonprofits fairly, there is room to accommodate some variation in system.  Public 
managers need to be ready to accommodate special cases, especially when nonprofits 
work with special populations or when the system is first being implemented.  Once a 
milestone system is in place, it is important to revisit the selection of milestones to ensure 
that the right outcomes have been selected.  This can be done in consultation with 
nonprofit organizations after they have had some experience with milestone funding. 
 
6. Study effective programs and disseminate best practices for achieving outcomes. 
Outcome funding is still in its infancy in nonprofit human services.  A critical task for 
public managers is building knowledge about effective performance-based contracting 
systems.  A critical step in this process is documenting and disseminating best practices 
so that others can learn and the field can continue to develop.  Public managers should 
also be open to the possibility that outcomes may work better in some fields of social 
service activity than in others.  Understanding exactly when, where, and why outcome 
funding is likely to be most helpful in improving performance needs to be illuminated 
through experimentation and analysis in the years ahead.  Public managers should take a 
lead role in this work. 
By breaking down some traditional boundaries and by challenging long standing 
operating principles, public and nonprofit managers can work together to deliver effective 
programs.  The Milestones system in Oklahoma represents a potent tool for advancing the 
shared interests of public and nonprofit sectors.  By holding nonprofits accountable for 
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producing results and by giving nonprofits substantial freedom in the design and 
implementation of interventions, Oklahoma has gone a long a way toward defining a 
model that others can apply and develop even further. 
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